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NOTES
Business Justification for Tying Agreements:
A Retreat from the Per Se Doctrine
IN AN INCREASINGLY COMPLEX economy, continuous attempts
by businessmen to gain economic advantages over their competi-
tors has often led to the evolution of unique commercial practices.
If these novel practices are to be held within the limits of fair corn-
petition, the courts must constantly revise their application of the
antitrust laws. Unfortunately, however, the Judiciary for many years
has been continuously frustrated in its attempts to control even the
simplest of these commercial arrangements.
Prominent among the vexatious practices is the tying agree-
ment which has been common to the business world for many
years' and has frustrated and irritated courts since its inception.2
The tying agreement is an arrangement by which.a supplier conditions
the sale of a highly desirable item - the tying product - on the
buyer's a'sent to purchase a separate commodity or service - the
tied product.
.1
A tying agreement generates two basic effects which controvert
the polic of free competition fundamental to the economy.3 First,
SUnited States v. United Shoe Mach. Co., 222 Fed. 349 (D. Mass. 1915), a1fId, 247
U.S. 32 (1918).
2 See, e.g., Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1 (1958); Times-Picayune
Publishing Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594 (1953); International Salt Co. v. United
States, 332 U.S. 392 (1947); Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-Contnent Inv. Co., 320 U.S. 661
(1944); Morton Salt Co. v. G. S. Suppiger Co., 314 U.S. 488 (1942); International
Business Mach. Corp. v. United States, 298 U.S. 131 (1936); United Shoe Mach. Corp.
v. United States, 258 U.S. 451 (1922); Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1
(1911).
3 See Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, supra note 2; Susser v. Carvel Corp.,
332 F.2d 505 (2d Cir. 1964), petition for cert. dismissed, 381 U.S. 125 (1965); Lessig
v. Tidewater Oil Co., 327 F.2d 459 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 993 (1964). As
stated in Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States, supra note 2, at 605- "Tying
agreements flout the Sherman Act's policy that competition rule the marts of trade.
Basic to the faith that a free economy best promotes the public weal is that goods must
stand the cold test of competition." For a more lengthy discussion of the effect of
tying agreements on competition, see generally, MILLER, UNFAIR COMPETITION' 191-
203 (1941); NEAL, THE ANTITRUST LAWS OF THE UNIT=D STATES OF AMERICA
68-72 (1960); STEvENS, UNFAIR COMPETITION 54-76 (1917); VAUGHAN, EcO-
NOMICS OF OUR PATENT SYSTEM 109-34 (1925); WATKINS, PUBLIC REGULA-
TION OF COMPETTIVE PRACTICES IN BUSINESS ENTERPRISE 220-28 (3d ed. 1940);
Lockhart & Sacks, The Relevance of Economic Factors in Determining Whether Exclu-
swe Arrangements Violate Section 3 of the Clayton Act, 65 HARv. 1. REv. 913 (1952).
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the buyer is forced to give up his right to choose which of several
brands of products he will purchase in the market of the tied prod-
uct. For instance, a buyer who wishes to obtain a sufficient sup-
ply of brand X picture tubes may be forced by the supplier of these
tubes to purchase a certain quantity of the supplier's transistor radios
or be denied the picture tubes which the buyer desires. Thus the
purchaser must forego his right to freely choose among brands X,
Y, and Z transistor radios. This example also illustrates the second
evil inherent in tie-ms; that is, the suppliers of brand Y and Z
radios are now foreclosed from a certain portion of the competitive
market in that product. Thus a tying agreement not only has an
adverse effect on buyers, but also diminishes the number of -out-
lets available to competitors of the supplier. Therefore, the evil
effect of a tie-in cannot be eliminated merely by granting the buyer
the right to purchase a competitor's goods if they are sold at -a lower
price than that of the tied product. Such an arrangement does not
lessen the burden on the competitors since they still must under-
cut the supplier's price while he need only meet theirs.4 In addi-
tion, it should be noted that such an arrangement does not com-
pletely eliminate the burden on the buyer who may want to pur-
chase goods of the competitor even though these goods are more
expensive.
Generally, the courts have been reluctant to permit the use of
a tying agreement and have rarely upheld its legality.5 Recently,
however, the courts in some cases have held6 and in other cases have
intimated7 that a tie-in may not be the intrinsically evil practice
which previous decisions had indicated. This uncertainty regarding
4 See International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392, 397 (1947).
5 Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1 (1958); Standard Oil Co. v. United
States, 337 U.S. 293 (1949); International Salt Co., v. United States, supra note 4;
International Business Mach. Corp. v. United States, 298 U.S. 131 (1936)
6 Crawford Transp. Co. v. Chrysler Corp., 338 F.2d 934 (6th Cir. 1964), cert. de-
nsed, 380 U.S. 954 (1965); United States v. Jerrold Electronics Corp., 187 F. Supp.
545 (E.D. Pa. 1960), affd per cur:am, 365 U.S. 567 (1961)
7White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253 (1963); Brown Shoe Co. v.
United States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962); Jerrold Electronics Corp. v. Wescoast Broad-
casting Co., 341 F.2d 653 (9th Cir. 1965); Susser v. Carvel Corp., 332 F.2d 505 (2d
Cir. 1964), petition for cert. dismissed, 381 U.S. 125 (1965); Baker v. Simmons Co.,
307 F.2d 458 (1st Cir. 1962); Dehydrating Process Co. v. A. 0. Smith Corp., 292 F.2d
653 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 931 (1961); Albert H. Cayne Equip. Corp. v.
Union Asbestos & Rubber Co., 220 F. Supp. 784 (S.D.N.Y. 1963)
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the legality of tying agreements has even permeated recent decisions
of the Unted States Supreme Court.'
It is the purpose of this Note to examine whether recent deci-
sions do in fact indicate a softening judical approach toward tying
agreements. In order to properly understand this problem, it is
necessary to examine the policy considerations which would accom-
pany such a trend and to consider whether this apparent leniency
is an indication that the doctrine of per se illegality will no longer
be controlling in tie-in cases.
1. CONGRESSIONAL RESTRICTIONS ON TYING AGREEMENTS
Businesses employing tying agreements may run afoul of one
or more of three federal statutes: the Sherman Act; the Clayton
Act; and the Federal Trade Commission Act.'
A. Sherman Act, Section 1
Section 1 of the Sherman Act" states that "every contract
in restraint of trade or commerce" is illegal. While this section has
been interpreted as barring only "unreasonable restraints" similar
to those prohibited under the "rule of reason" test at common
law," the courts have, nevertheless, designated certain types of busi-
ness practices as unreasonable per se. When one of these restraints
is shown to exist, the courts will assume the existence of a viola-
tion of section 1 notwithstanding the justifications for the partcu-
lar practice." The harsh treatment accorded to these per se viola-
tions is normally explained as being only logical in view of "their
pernicious effect on competition and lack of any redeeming vir-
tue."13
8 Compare United States v. Jerrold Electronics Corp., 187 F. Supp. 545 (E.D. Pa.
1960), a!Id perzuriam, 365 U.S. 567 (1961), with Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States,
356 U.S. 1 (1958). The Court's recent opinion in Atlantic Ref. Co. v. FTC, 381 U.S.
357 (1965), which involved a vertical arrangement similar to a tie-in, was couched in
more definite phraseology than previous decisions. However, the majority of the opin-
ion consists of mere conclusions rather than clear explanations.
9 Sherman Act S 1, 26 Stat. 209 (1890), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1964); Clay-
ton Act § 3, 38 Star. 731 (1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 14 (1964); Federal Trade
Commission Act § 5, 38 Star. 719 (1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 45 (a) (1964)
State regulations which might be applicable to tying agreements are beyond the scope
of this Note, For a concise study of state antitrust provisions see generally Hanson &
von Kalinowski, The Status of State Antitrust Laws with Federal Analysts, 15 W RES.
L. REv. 9 (1963); Note, State Antitrust Provistons, 15 W REs. L. REv. 126 (1963)
1026 Stat. 209 (1890), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1964).
11 Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231 (1918); Standard Oil Co.
v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 60 (1911)
2 United States v. Columbia Steel Co., 334 U.S. 495, 522 (1948).
13 Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958).
1965]
WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
B. Clayton Act, Section 3
While the more specific terms of section 3 of the Clayton Act 4
offer a dearer delineation of antitrust restrictions on trade restraints
than their counterparts in section I of the Sherman Act, the exis-
tence of these specific provisions has occasionally resulted in a severe
limitation on the scope of the statute's coverage. 5 This litmtation
is best illustrated by the inapplicability of section 3 to situations
where a restraint is placed on "services" as opposed to "commodi-
ties" offered by a competitor."
The applicability of section 3 is expressly limited to restraints
of trade which "substantially lessen competition or tend to create
a monopoly in any line of commerce."'" This qualifying clause
has been interpreted as prohibiting sales conditioned upon the
buyer's agreement not to use goods of the supplier's competitors
where the supplier is in a position of "market dominance"' 8 or
where the agreement will foreclose competitors from a substantial
share of the line of commerce affected.' 9 The latter proviso re-
quires only that the restraint have a tendency to lessen competition;
no proof of an actual decrease in a competitor's business is neces-
sary.2
0
C. Federal Trade Commission Act, Section 5
Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act' (FTCA)
prohibits "unfair methods of competition in commerce." Included
among violations of this section are those which run "counter to
1438 Star. 731 (1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C. S 14 (1964). Section 3 states in
part:
It shall be unrawful for any person engaged in commerce, in the course of
such commerce, to lease or make a sale or contract for sale of goods, wares
or other commodities on the condition, agreement, or understanding
that the lessee or purchaser thereof shall not use or deal in the goods, wares
or other commodities of a competitor or competitors of the lessor or seller
where the effect of such lease, sale, or contract for sale or such condition, agree-
ment, or understanding may be to substantially lessen competition or tend to
create a monopoly in any line of commerce. btd.
15 See, e.g., Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293, 297 (1948)
16 Columbia Broadcasting Sys. v. Amana Refrigeration, Inc., 295 F.2d 375 (7th Cir.
1961), cert. dented, 369 U.S. 812 (1962); United States v. Jerrold Electronics Corp.,
187 F. Supp. 545 (E.D. Pa. 1960), aff'd per curtanm, 365 U.S. 567 (1961).
1738 Stat. 731 (1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 14 (1964).
STimes-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594, 606-07 (1953)
See text Lccompanying notes 79-89 infra.
19 Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 337 U.S..293, 299 (1949).
20 Standard Fashion Co. v. Magrane-Houston Co., 258 U.S. 346, 356-57 (1922).
2138 Star. 719 (1914), as amended, 15 U.S:C. § 4 5(a) (1964)
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the public policy declared in the Sherman and Clayton Acts" of en-
couraging unrestricted competition.22 The FTCA grants the Fed-
eral Trade Commission and the courts "adequate powers to hit at
every trade practice, then existing or thereafter contrived, which
restrained competition or imght lead to such restraint if not stopped
in its incipient stages."23 Because of the broad terms of section 5,
the Commission is often in a position to attack a business practice
which, while not an express violation of either the Sherman or the
Clayton Acts, still amounts to an unfair method of competition
within the terms of the FTCA.2" The determination of whether
a method of competition is unfair has purposely been left to the
discretion of the Commission.25
I. THE DETECTION OF TYING AGREEMENTS
Generally, a seller's refusal to supply a buyer with product A
unless the buyer also purchases product B constitutes a tying agree-
22 Fashion Originators' Guild of America v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457, 463 (1941). The
FICA is "in par materia" with the Sherman and Clayton Acts. Menzies v. FTC, 242
F.2d 81 (4th Cir.), cert. dented, 353 U.S. 957 (1957). For examples of the application
of the standards of the Sherman and Clayton Acts to actions initiated by the Federal
Trade Commission, see Atlantic Ref. Co. v. FTC 381 U.S. 357 (1965); FTC v. Motion
Picture Advertising Serv. Co., 344 U.S. 392 (1953).
23 FTC v. Cement Institute, 333 U.S. 683, 693 (1948).
24 See, e.g., FTC v. Motion Picture Advertising Serv. Co., 344 U.S. 392 (1953);
FTC v. Cement Institute, supra note 23. The defendant-respondent in the Motion Pic-
ture decision, a producer and distributor of movies, had exclusive contracts with forty
per cent of the theatres which exhibited the films in the area of respondent's operations.
The respondent and three other companies had exclusive contracts with seventy-five per
cent of such theatres in the United States. The Court upheld a Commission finding
that the exclusive contracts unreasonably restrained competition and tended toward
monopoly and that their use was an unfair method of competition. In doing so, the
Court thought it necessary to note that "the 'unfair methods of the competition,' which
are condemned by § 5 (a) of the Act, are not confined to those that were illegal at com-
mon law or that were condemned by the Sherman Act." FTC v. Motion Picture Adver-
rising Serv. Co., 344 U.S. 392, 394 (1953). See also Fashion Originators' Guild of
America v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457, 463 (1941) where the purpose of the FTCA was char-
acterized as an attempt to prevent in their incipiency those practices which would in the
future develop into violations of the Sherman or Clayton Acts.
25 In doing so, the Congress recognized the hopelessness of attempting to define "the
many and variable unfair practices which prevail in commerce. "' S. REP. No. 597,
63d Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1914). The House Report indicated that the legislators real-
ized that the best method of preventing unfair competition was "through the action of
an administrative body of practical men who will be able to apply the rule enacted
by Congress to particular business situations, so as to eradicate evils with the least risk
of interfering with legitimate business operations." H.R. REP. No. 1142, 63d Cong.,
2d Sess. 19 (1914). In Atlantic Ref. Co. v. FTC, 381 U.S. 357 (1965), the Court
approvingly noted that "in thus divining that there is no limit to business ingenuity and
legal gymnastics, the Congress displayed much foresight." Id. at 367
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ment. However, there are several factors which occasionally make
the presence of a tie-in difficult to distinguish.2"
A. The Absence of an Express Contractual Provision
Many agreements which effectively result in a tie-in do not
contain express provisions to that effect in the written contract. In
these situations the courts will look at the conduct of the respective
parties and, in proper circumstances, may infer the existence of a
tying agreement. When such an inference is made, the absence
of an express provision will not deter the courts from applying anti-
trust principles to determine the legality of the arrangement.'
B. Agreement Containing Multi-Restraints
Confusion also results when a single business transaction in-
cludes several different restraints on the freedom of the buyer or
lessee. For example, the same requirements contract28 may in-
dude both a tying arrangement and an exclusive dealing2" provi-
sion. The difficulties inherent in these situations are somewhat
alleviated, however, by the courts' application of the same standards
of legality whether a tie-in is the sole restraint present or is com-
bined with another restriction."
C. The Necessity of Separate Products
Notwithstanding the uncertainty which the above factors might
create in determining the presence of a tying agreement, the prm-
2 6 For an example of the difficulty which courts sometimes experience in identifying
tie-ins, see, e.g., Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293, 305 n.8 (1949);
Susser v. Carvel Corp., 332 F.2d 505, 511 (2d Cir. 1964), petition for cert. dismissed,
381 U.S. 125 (1965).
2 7 United States v. Parke, Davis & Co., 362 U.S. 29 (1960); Osborn v. Sinclair Ref.
Co., 286 F.2d 832 (4th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 963 (1961); McElhenney
v. Western Auto Supply Co., 269 F.2d 332 (4th Cit. 1959) Compare Interstate Cir-
cuit, Inc. v. United States, 306 U.S. 208 (1939), wherein the Supreme Court noted the
presence of a conspiracy in violation of the Sherman Act despite the absence of an ex-
press contract.
28 In a requirements contract, the seller and the buyer agree that the buyer will pur-
chase from the seller all of the buyer s requirements of a certain product for a stated
period of time. See Lockhart & Sacks, supra note 3, at 914.
29 An exclusive dealing arrangement requires dealers to handle only the goods of a
certain supplier to the exclusion of all competing products. See Lockhart & Sacks, supra
note 3, at 914. See generally Paley, Antitrust Pitfalls in Excluswe Dealing - Recent
Developments Under the Sherman, Clayton and FTC Acts, 37 NOTRE DAMm LAW. 499
(1962).
30 Susser v. Carvel Corp., 332 F.2d 505, 511 (2d Cir. 1964), petition for cert. dis-
missed, 381 U.S. 125 (1965).
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cipal difficulty experienced in this area is the decision as to whether
product A is actually separate and distinct from product B."' If A
and B are not so intimately connected as to make their separation
impractical, then any attempt to tie the sale of one to the sale of
the other will be subject to close scrutiny by the courts.
The demands of marketing often compel a business to com-
bine two or more products into a single unit for purposes of distri-
bution and sale. Such a situation might occur if a manufacturer
markets a very intricate electrical output system which will not
yield the desired result unless combined with a specially-designed
receiver set. In some circumstances, the manufacturer might prop-
erly refuse to sell the output system unless the buyer also purchases
the receiver set. Here, the two products might be construed as
constituting a single item which must be purchased as a unit. In
such a case, no tie-in exists and a finding as to the legality of the
arrangement is unnecessary. But distinguishing between those
products which are inseparable and those which are not is often a
formidable task."2 A possible solution to this question was sug-
gested in the case of United States v. Jerrold Electroncs Corp.,."
wherein the district court set up four criteria by which to determine
the severability of products: 4 (1) the practice of others in the
same field; (2) the consistency of the composition of each unit;
(3) the invoicing system employed by the supplier; and (4) the
existence of other related products which are not included in the
unit.
(1) The practice of others in the same field.-If competitors of
the supplier also sell the products in question as a single unit, this
supports the contention that these products do in fact constitute a
single item. A contrary practice by others in the field, however,
suggests the opposite conclusion.
(2) The consistency of the compositon of each unit.-The sale
of a consistently homogeneous combination of two products indicates
that the products are actually only elements of a single item. But
if the combinations vary considerably from one sale to the next,
31 See International Mfg. Co. v. Landon, Inc., 336 F.2d 723 (9th Cir. 1964), cert.
dented, 379 U.S. 988 (1965); United States v. Jerrold Electronics Corp., 187 F. Supp.
545 (E.D. Pa. 1960), aIfd Per curam, 365 U.S. 567 (1961).
32 See United States v. Loew's Inc., 371 U.S. 38 (1962); Associated Press v. Taft-
Ingalls Corp., 340 F.2d 753 (6th Cir. 1965).
3 187 F. Supp. 545 (E.D. Pa. 1960), aff'd per curtanm, 365 U.S. 567 (1961).
34 For an application of these four criteria, see Associated Press v. Taft-Ingalls Corp.,
340 F.2d 753 (6th Cir. 1965); United States v. Jerrold Electronics Corp., supra note 33.
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the court may find that the basic products are indeed distinct and
are only combined to satisfy a current demand. In the Jerrold case, 5
the supplier's contention that the products which he offered as a
combination were inseparable, was negated by the fact that the com-
bmations varied from sale to sale.
(3) The invoicing system employed by the supplier -The ut-
lization of a lump-sum billing arrangement for the combination in-
dicates that the supplier views the item as a basic product and the
elements of the unit as indivisible parts of the complete item. How-
ever, if the customer is billed for each particular part of the com-
bmation, the inference is that the alleged unit is in fact a conglom-
eration of separate and distinct products.
(4) The existence of other related products which are not in-
cluded in the unit.-If the supplier markets other items with charac-
teristics similar to the products combined in the unit and yet does not
include these other items within the combination, the court might
infer that the elements of the combination could be sold separately
just as the other products. Similarly, if the seller combines all of
his products. in one particular field into a single unit, this is an indi-
cation that these products are actually indivisible and can legiti-
mately be sold as a unit.
The difficulty confronting the courts in the area of divisibility
of products is illustrated by the opposite results reached in two
Supreme Court decisions, Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United
States,36 and United States v. Loew's Inc. 7 In Times, the Court
found that advertising space sold in a morning paper was not sepa-
rate or distinct from advertising sold in an evening paper where the
two publications were "under single ownership at the same place,
tine, and terms and sell indistinguishable products to advertisers;
no dominant 'tying' product exists no leverage in one market
excludes sellers in the second, because for present purposes the
products are identical and the market the same.""8 The Court in
Loew's refused to recognize the defendant's contention that so-called
"'block-booking" of films to the TV stations was not a tie-in since
the individual films were inseparable and only elements in one prod-
uct unit - the whole block of films. Instead, the Court agreed
with the district court's finding that each copyrighted film was in
35 United States v. Jerrold Electronics Corp., 187 F. Supp. 545, 559 (E.D. Pa.
1960), afI'd per curwm, 365 U.S. 567 (1961)
36 345 U.S. 594 (1953)
37371 U.S. 38 (1962).
38 Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594, 614 (1953).
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itself a unique product and held that the "block-booking" was an
illegal tying arrangement.3"
The facts in Times and Loew's are not so different as to justify
opposite conclusions on the question of separability." The divid-
ing line between separable and inseparable products is neither dis-
tinct nor unyielding. Thus, an application of the four Jerrold cri-
teria to the facts of each case seems to constitute the most desirable
approach yet developed to determine the question of separability of
products.
The Jerrold tests are helpful only in determining the presence
of a tie-in. If such an arrangement is found to exist, the more
arduous task of finding whether the tie-in violates the antitrust
laws remains. However, the question of separability of products
should not be forgotten, for it has assumed added importance in
some cases by virtue of the fact that it provides the courts with an
opportunity to indirectly recognize business justificaton41 as a miti-
gating circumstance for what might otherwise have been an illegal
tying agreement.4"
III. JUDICIAL TREATMENT OF TYING AGREEMENTS
A brief survey of the history of tying arrangements reveals the
constant suspicion with which they have been viewed by courts for
many decades. This suspicion is undoubtedly based on the theory
that the evils inherent in this business practice are normally great
enough to outweigh any possible advantages which might result
from its employment. Generally, the courts have been so con-
vmced of the lack of any redeeming virtue in tying agreements that
they have resorted to testing the legality of these practices through
3 9 Umted States v. Loew's Inc., 371 U.S. 38, 48 (1962). For a detailed discussion
of the ramifications of block-booking on the copyright laws, see United States v. Para-
mount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 156-58 (1948).
40 The Court in Loew's did not attempt to distinguish the Times holding on separa-
bility, apparently feeling that the individual movies included in the Loew's block-book-
ing scheme were not analogous to the particular advertising spaces held not to be sepa-
rable in Times. But it is certainly arguable that advertising in a morning newspaper
which will reach a market completely different from that covered by an afternoon paper
is as distinct from the afternoon advertising as the movie "Casablanca" is from the
film "Tugboat Annie Sails Again."
41 Business considerations which might justify the use of a ue-in may be found in
any number of situations, such as breaking into a new area of competition, meeting
similar practices by competitors, reducing production costs, etc. See text accompanying
notes 94-103 infra.
4 2 See, e.g., Dehydrating Process Co. v. A. 0. Smith Corp., 292 F.2d 653 (1st Cir.),
cert. denied, 368 U.S. 931 (1961).
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an application of the controversial per se doctrine. The acceptance
of this harsh, unyielding rule in the tie-in cases is only one phase
in the swift development of the doctrine in recent years.
A. The Evolution of the Per Se Doctrine
Historically, the legality of restraints of trade was tested through
an application of the rule of reason.43 The theory behind such an
approach was effectively enunciated in Chicago Bd. of Trade v.
United States." In recognizing that no inflexible rule could be
applied to every restraining business practice, the Supreme Court
stated:
Every agreement concerning trade, every regulation of trade, re-
strains. To bind, to restrain, is of their very essence. The true
test of legality is whether the restraint imposed is such as merely
regulates and perhaps thereby promotes competition or whether it
is such as may suppress or even destroy competton.45
In judging the reasonableness of a particular restraint, courts have
traditionally looked at such considerations as the per cent of busi-
ness controlled, the strength of the remaining competitors, and the
business requirements which prompted the adoption of the arrange-
ment under investigation.40
Recently, however, the courts have tended to disregard the rule
of reason and have instead resorted to declaring trade practices un-
reasonable per se whenever these practices had the effect of fore-
closing competitors from any substantial market.47 While the per
se doctrine has been a relative "late-bloomer" among antitrust
theories, its appearance was at least foreshadowed by the 1927
decision in United States v. Trenton Potteries Co.," where the Court
stated:
Agreements which create potential power [of market domi-
4sChicago Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231 (1918); United States v.
Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 Fed. 271 (6th Cir. 1898), modified, 175 U.S. 211
(1899); von Kalinowski, The Per Se Doctrine - An Emerging Philosophy of Ant-
trust Law, 11 U.C.L.A.L. REV. 569, 570 (1964)
44246 U.S. 231 (1918).
451d. at 238.
"Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594, 615 (1953); see
Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918). See also United
States v. Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp., 137 F. Supp. 78 (S.D. Cal. 1955). The
rule of reason did not, as is often alleged, emasculate attempts to strike down unlawful
restraints of trade. See United States v. General Motors, Inc., 121 F.2d 376, 397 (7th
Cir.) cert. dented, 314 U.S. 618 (1941) for an example of a case where a tie-in was
found unlawful through an application of the rule of reason.
47 Cf. International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392 (1947).
48273 U.S. 392 (1927)
[Vol 17.257
TYING AGREEMENTS
nancel may well be held to be in themselves unreasonable or un-
lawful restraints, without the necessity of minute inquiry [into]
whether [the practice] is reasonable or unreasonable. 49
The Supreme Court recently rephrased the per se doctrine in North-
ern Pac. Ry. v. United States5" wherein it defined the scope of the
rule as follows:
There are certain agreements or practices which because of their
pernmcous effect on competition and lack of any redeeming virtue
are conclusively presumed to be unreasonable and therefore illegal
without elaborate inquiry as to the precise harm they have caused
or the business excuse for their use.51
While the harsh doctrine of per se illegality has often been
criticzed,52 the rule nevertheless has been applied to numerous van-
eties of trade restraints." Such practices as price-fixing, market
division among competitors, group boycotts, and tying agreements
have been prohibited through the application of the rigid per se
standard. The courts, after noting the "pericious effect" which
such practices have on competition, further justify their resort to
the per se doctrine on two additional grounds. First, by consistent-
ly employing the same criterion to determine the legality of cer-
tain business practices, the judiciary generates more confidence in
the minds of businessmen who are attempting to determine whether
procedures which they are contemplating will run afoul of the
antitrust laws."' If a supplier is previously advised that price-fix-
ing agreements are definitely a violation of the law, he is less likely
to attempt to negotiate such arrangements in the first place. The
result would not only be a decrease in the amount of litigation in-
volving such practices, but would also be a savings to business of
the time and money otherwise spent in developing and defending
these illegal practices. Secondly, the courts reason that an applica-
tion of the per se rule to cases which do reach the litigation stage
will free judges from the burden of being forced to determine the
"reasonableness" of the particular restraint, a task which normally
requires a copious study of voluminous business records and market
reports.5 When a per se violation is alleged, the defendant is barred
49 Id. at 397.
r 356 U.S. 1 (1958).
51 Id. at 5. (Emphasis added.)
52 See, e.g., von Kalinowski, sapra note 43, at 591.
53 See note 68 infra.
5 4 Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958).
5 I1bIba. For an example of the burden which such examinations place on the courts,
see United States v. E. L duPont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377 (1956).
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from any attempt to cloud the real issues through the submission of
countless documents demonstrating his justification for the particu-
lar practice.5" Instead, the accused must either deny the alleged
facts or show that the facts do not constitute a per se violation. If
he fails to do so, summary judgment for the plaintiff will be
granted.5"
Despite the obvious benefits attainable by an application of the
per se doctrine, the utilization of such an uncompromising rule has
one major disadvantage - the flexibility so vital to antitrust law
vanishes entirely. While there are many considerations which
might sustain the use of a more adaptable rule, the most tenable
argument for flexibility rests in the occasional existence of a legiti-
mate business motive for the imposition of certain trade restraints."
A rule which is blind to mitigating circumstances is, at best, of ques-
tionable benefit. But whether the drawbacks of the per se doctrine
are sufficiently detrimental to occasion a return to the standard of
reasonableness remains to be seen. In some recent te-in cases the
criteria of the per se rule and the rule of reason have been inter-
twined to such an extent that they are incapable of distinction."
This indiscriminate intermingling of terminology from both rules
has only served to increase the confusion surrounding the applica-
tion of the per se doctrine to tying agreements.
B. Tying Agreements and the Per Se Doctrine
The validity of tying agreements was originally contested under
patent law since generally the tying product was protected by a pat-
ent monopoly.' In two early cases, Heaton-Penrsular Button-
56 See Van Cise, Future of Per Se in Antitrust Law, 50 VA. L Rnv. 1165 (1964).
57 White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253 (1963). "A trial to show their
[per se violations) nature, extent, and degree is no longer necessary." Id. at 260. The
plaintiff's burden is further diminished by the absence of a necessity of proving a public
injury when a per se violation is alleged; such a showing must be made when the "rule
of reason" is employed. Reliable Volkswagon Sales & Serv. Co. v. World-Wide Auto
Corp., 182 F. Supp. 412, 427 (D.N.J. 1960).58 See, e.g., Crawford Transp. Co. v. Chrysler Corp., 338 F.2d 934 (6th Cir. 1964),
cert. demed, 380 U.S. 954 (1965); Dehydrating Process Co. v. A. 0. Smith Corp., 292
F.2d 653 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 931 (1961); United States v. Jerrold Elec-
tronics Corp., 187 F. Supp. 545 (E.D. Pa. 1960), aff'd per curtam, 365 U.S. 567
(1961).
59 See, e.g., Jerrold Electronics Corp. v. Wescoast Broadcasting Co., 341 F.2d 653
(9th Cir. 1965); Crawford Transp. Co. v. Chrysler Corp., supra note 58; Dehydrating
Process Co. v. A. 0. Smith Corp., supra note 58.
60 For a discussion of the historical aspects of tie-ins, see Turner, Validity of Tying
Arrangements Under the Antitrust Laws, 72 HARV. L. REV. 50 (1958) An analysis
of the economic aspects of patent tie-ins may be found in Bowman, Tying Arrangements
and the Leverage Problem, 67 YALE L.J. 19 (1957)
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Fastener Co. v. Eureka Specialty Co."' and Henry v. A.B. Dick
Co.,2 tie-ms involving a patented tying product were upheld as
valid extensions of the patent monopoly; however, such reasoning
was ultimately rejected by the Supreme Court in 1917 63
Subsequent cases decided under patent law further developed
the restrictions on the use of the patent monopoly to force the pur-
chase of other products. 4 The Supreme Court in International Salt
Co. v. United States65 ruled that any tying agreement utilizing a
patented tying product would doubtless have anti-competitive con-
sequences and was thus illegal under the antitrust laws.6" The
Court reasoned that a prospective buyer in these circumstances,
would be4forced to submit to the terms of the tie-in because of his
inability to obtain the patented product elsewhere. Since the de-
cision in International Salt, courts have consistently found patent
tie-ins to be illegal per se; that is, the patent gave the patentee the
sufficient market dominance in the tying product necessary to sus-
tam a holding of per se illegality.67
Moreover, the application of the theory of per se illegality has
not been confined to tie-ins involving patented products. Tying
arrangements where the tying item is non-patented are also subject
6177 Fed. 288 (6th Cit. 1896).
62224 U.S. 1 (1912).
6 Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502 (1917).64 Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-Continent Inv. Co., 320 U.S. 661 (1944); Morton Salt
Co. v. G. S. Suppiger Co., 314 U.S. 488 (1942); Ethyl Gasoline Corp. v. United States,
309 U.S. 436 (1940); Leitch Mfg. Co. v. Barber Co., 302 U.S. 458 (1938); Carbice
Corp. v. American Patent Dev. Corp., 283 U.S. 27 (1931).
65332 U.S. 392 (1947).
601d. at 396; see United States v. Loew's Inc., 371 U.S. 38, 46 (1962) But see
International Mfg. Co. v. Landon, Inc., 336 F.2d 723 (9th Cir. 1964), cert. denied,
379 U.S. 988 (1965).
67 See, e.g., Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293, 307 (1947); United
States v. Griffith, 334 U.S. 100 (1948) But see United States v. Loew s Inc., supra
note 66, at 49-50 where the majority opinion states:
There may be rare circumstances in which the doctrine we have enunciated
under § 1 of the Sherman Act prohibiting tying arrangements involving
patented or copyrighted tying products is inapplicable. However, we find
it difficult to conceive of such a case.
A less restictive view of the patent's function of establishing automatic market domi-
nance is also taken in the ATT'Y GEN. NAT'L COMM. ANTITRUST REP. (1955). After
noting that narrow and unimportant patents may not yield any market power. to the
patentee, the Report states:
Accordingly, where the tying product is patented, the patentee should be
permitted to show that in the entire factual setting, including the scope of the
patent in relation to other patented or unpatented products, the patent does
not create the market power requisite to illegality of the tying clause. Id. at
238.
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to the scrutiny of the per se rule"' as are other methods of trade
restraint"9 The rapidly-expanding area in which the rule has been
applied has served to increase the bitter controversy surrounding
the doctrine.7"
The determination of whether a specific tying agreement is a
per se violation of the antitrust laws has perplexed both the courts71
and legal scholars.7s Tying agreements generally "fare harshly
under the laws forbidding restraints of trade,"7 because they "serve
hardly any purpose beyond the suppression of competition."7 The
inclusion of tie-ins among the group of restraints which have a
"pernicious effect" on competition by the Supreme Court in its
decision in Northern Pac. Ry. v United States75 seemddl to herald
the demise of all tying agreements. But while the general language
in the.Northern Pac. case indicated the Court's inclination toward
an extension of the per se rule, the majority opinion nevertheless
utilized the more specific per se criteria previously applied to tie-
ins in its decision in Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United
States.7
6
Because of the different terminology contained in the pertinent
sections of the Sherman and Clayton Acts, the Court in Times
promulgated separate criteria for the application of the per se rule
under each of the two statutes. The provisions of the Clayton Act
which forbid restraints that could potentially lessen competition
were interpreted so as to render a tying agreement per se unreason-
able if either (1) the seller maintains a monopolistic position in the
68 See, e.g., Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1 (1958) (transporting
services tied to sale of real estate); Osborn v. Sinclair Ref. Co., 286 F.2d 832 (4th Cir.
1960), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 963 (1961) (sales of tires, batteries, and accessories tied
to granting of gas station franchise).
69 See United States v. Parke, Davis & Co., 362 U.S. 29 (1960) (vertical price fix-
ing); Kors, Inc. v. Broadway Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207 (1959) (group boy-
cotts), United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940) (horizontal
price-fixing); United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 Fed. 271 (6th Cit. 1898),
modified, 175 U.S. 211 (1899) (division of markets)
70 Compare von Kalinowsks, supra note 43, with Van Cise, supra note 56.
71 Compare Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1 (1958), with United
States v. Jerrold Electronics Corp., 187 F. Supp. 545 (E.D. Pa. 1960), a! 'd per curtain,
365 U.S. 567 (1961).
7 2 Loevinger, The Rule of Reason in Antitrust Law, 50 VA. L. REv. 23 (1964); see
I TRaAD REG. RIP. 5 124 (1961).
73 Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594, 606 (1953), cit-
ing FTC v. Gratz, 253 U.S. 421 (1920).
74 Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 377 U.S. 293, 305 (1949) (dictum)
7 5 356 U.S. 1 (1958)
76345 U.S. 594 (1953)
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"tying product's" market or (2) the particular restraint being prac-
ticed affects a substantial volume of commerce in the "tied product."
But the Sherman Act's more general terms which prohibit the fore-
closure of competitors from any substantial market were found to
require that both of the above conditions be met in order that a
tie-in constitute a per se violation.7 The Court also noted that a
tying arrangement may be a violation of section 5 of the Federal
Trade Commission Act's ban on "unfair methods of competition"
regardless of the presence or absence of one or both of the two ele-
ments."8 The two characteristics which govern the application of
the per se rule to tie-ms - market dominance and influence on a
substantial amount of commerce -deserve careful analysis for each
is significant in judging the legality of tying agreements.
(1) Market dominance.-The Supreme Court's interpretation
of this phrase has varied considerably since the decision in Standard
Oil Co. v. United States9 wherein the Court equated "market domi-
nance" with "market control.""0  Subsequent constructions of
"market dominance" became less and less demandingS until finally
in the Northern Pac. decision the Court concluded that the require-
ment demanded nothing "more than sufficient economic power to
impose an appreciable restraint on free competition in the tied pro-
duct.. "82 Most recently in United States v. Loew's Inc.s the
Court specified that sufficient economic power could be "inferred
from the tying product's desirability to consumers or from unique-
77 Id. at 608-09. It is important to recall that the Clayton Act restrictions apply
only when the tied item is a "commodity" as distinguished from a "service" etc.
78 Ibid.
79 337 U.S. 293, 306 (1949).
80 Ibid.
81 See, e.g., Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594, 608
(1953) wherein the Court required some type of "monopoly power."
82 Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 11 (1958); see Osborn v. Sinclair
Ref. Co., 286 F.2d 832 (4th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 963 (1961). In the
recent decision of Atlantic Ref. Co. v. FTC 381 U.S. 357 (1965), the Court explained
its prior pronouncements on the requirement of economic power. In discussing the
inherent power which a gasoline supplier has over its dealers, the Court noted:
Among the sources of leverage in Atlantlc's hands are its lease and equip-
ment loan contracts with their cancellation and short-term provisions
It must also be remembered that Atlantic controlled the supply of gasoline
and oil to its wholesalers and dealers. This was an additional source of eco-
nomic leverage as was its extensive control of all advertising on the
premises of its dealers. Id. at 368.
See also Simpson v. Union Oil Co., 377 U.S. 13 (1964).
83 37 1 U.S. 38 (1962).
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ness in its attributes' 84 and therefore concluded that investigations
into such questions as the scope of the relevant market and the sup-
plier's percentage of that market are rarely necessary.85 Clearly,
the more liberal construction of "market dominance" has reduced
the proof needed to show the existence of this element of the per se
rule to a less than exacting requirement. Such circumstances as the
mere presence of a large number of tying agreements,86 the exist-
ence of a patented"7 or copyrighted 8 tying product, or even the
presence of a trademark' are usually enough to constitute "suf-
ficient economic power."
(2) Restraont of a substantal volume of commerce.-In a sm-
lar fashion, the proof required to show that the tie-in under mvesti-
gation affects a "substantial volume of commerce" has been signifi-
candy reduced in recent years. Previously, it was necessary that a
practice foreclose competitors from a substantial market in order
to be labelled a per se violation." Currently, however, a restraint
which affects a "not insubstantial" amount of commerce will quali-
fy for per se treatment." The relaxation of this requirement is re-
flected in the failure of recent decisions to even mention the amount
of commerce affected by the particular restraint being attacked. 2
84 Id. at 45; see Lessig v. Tidewater Oil Co., 327 F.2d 459 (9th Cir.), cert. dented,
377 U.S. 993 (1964) But see Brown Shoe Co. v. FTC, 339 F.2d 45 (8th Cir. 1964),
petition for cert. filed, 33 U.S.L. WEEK 3369 (U.S. May 7, 1965) (No. 1141, 1964
Term; renumbered No. 118, 1965 Term)
85 United States v. Loew's Inc., 371 U.S. 38, 49 (1962).
86 Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1958).
87 International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392 (1947). See text accom-
panying notes 61-67 supra.
88 United States v. Loews Inc., 371 U.S. 38 (1962); United States v. Paramount
Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131 (1948).
89 Cf. Susser v. Carvel Corp., 332 F.2d 505 (2d Cir. 1964), petition for cert. dis-
-missed, 381 U.S. 125 (1965), noted in 63 MICH. L REV. 550 (1965). See also Den
son Mattress Factory v. Spring-Air Co., 308 F.2d 403 (5th Cir. 1962); Switzer Bros.
v. Locklin, 297 F.2d 39 (7th Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 851 (1962); Dawn
Donut Co. v. Hartes Food Stores, Inc., 267 F.2d 358 (2d Cir. 1959); Anchor Serum
Co. v. FTC, 217 F.2d 867 (7th Cir. 1954); Temperato v. Horstman, 321 S.W.2d 657
(Mo. Sup. Ct. 1959). For detailed analyses of the relationship of trademarks to tying
agreements, see generally Note, Trademarks and the Antitrust Laws, 68 HARV. L. REV.
895 (1955); Note, Antitrust Problems tn Trademark Licensing, 17 STAN. L REv. 926
(1965).
9
°Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594, 608 (1953); Stan-
dard Oil Co. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293, 311-12 (1949).
91 Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 11 (1958). The court in Osborn
v. Sinclair Ref. Co., 286 F.2d 832 (4th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 963 (1961)
required only that the practice affect more than a "de minimis" amount of commerce.
92 See, e.g., Lessig v. Tidewater Oil Co., 327 F.2d 459, 468 n.21 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 377 U.S. 993 (1964).
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Conceivably, the more liberal construction of the above restric-
tions could have created an environment hostile to all trade re-
straints regardless of the existence of any circumstances which might
excuse the use of such procedures. Quite to the contrary, however,
some courts now seem to be making an increasing effort to deter-
mine if tying agreements, even though possessing all of the requi-
sites necessary to be declared unreasonable per se, are somehow
justified. 3
IV BUSINESS JUSTIFICATION FOR TYING AGREEMENTS
There are certain instances in which tying agreements may be
instituted for purposes other than the stifling of competition. Pos-
sible justification for a tie-m may be found in a variety of circum-
stances. A manufacturer who markets a very complex product may
feel that he alone can properly install or service the item.94 He may
doubt that his goods will function properly unless used in conjunc-
tion with other of his products. 5 A trademark owner may fear
that the inherent value of his mark will decrease unless the mark
appears where his own, high-quality products are in use. 6 Each
of these situations is an example of a condition in which a manu-
facturer might attempt to protect the good-will of his business
through the use of a tie-r. In each of these cases, while the tying
agreement might constitute a per se violation of the antitrust laws,
the supplier's business may depend on his continued adherence to
this particular practice. Admittedly, there are instances in which
the manufacturer can adequately protect his interests through the
issuance of specifications for the use of his product or through
93 See, e.g., Jerrold Electronics Corp. v. Wescoast Broadcasting Co., 341 F.2d 653
(9th Cir. 1965); Crawford Transp. Co. v. Chrysler Corp., 338 F.2d 934 (6th Cir.
1964), cert. dented, 380 U.S. 954 (1965); Baker v. Simmons Co., 307 F.2d 453 (1st
Cir. 1962); Dehydrating Process Co. v. A. 0. Smith Corp., 292 F.2d 653 (1st Cir.),
cert. denied, 368 U.S. 931 (1961); United States v. Jerrold Electronics Corp., 187 F.
Supp. 545 (-D. Pa. 1960), af'd per curtain, 365 U.S. 567 (1961)
94 See United States v. Jerrold Electronics Corp., supra note 93.
95 See International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392 (1947); International
Business Mach. Corp. v. United States, 298 U.S. 131 (1936); United Shoe Mach. Corp.
v. United States, 258 U.S. 451 (1922).
96See Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293 (1949); Susser v. Carvel
Corp., 332 F.2d 505 (2d Cir. 1964), petition for cert. dismissed, 381 U.S. 125 (1965);
Baker v. Simmons Co., 307 F.2d 458 (1st Cir. 1962); Denison Mattress Factory v.
Spring-Air Co., 308 F.2d 403 (5th Cir. 1962). For a discussion of the advantages and
disadvantages resulting from an adherence to a policy of allowing tie-ins in such circum-
stances, see Comment, Tying Arrangements Under the Antitrust Laws: The "Integrity
of the Product" Defense, 62 MCa. L. REv. 1413 (1964)
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warnings on the product label. 7 Such procedures, however, while
possibly offering some protection to the manufacturer from breach
of contract suits, are no guarantee that a dissatisfied customer who
failed to heed the warnings will refrain from disparaging the man-
ufacturer's products or business. 8
The protection of the good-will of a supplier is not the only
legitimate purpose which a tae-in might serve. A supplier may
require his buyers to sign tying agreements as a protective measure
against the supplier's competitors who may be engaging in a similar
practice9 or achieving the same result through procedures not avail-
able to the seller."' Similarly, a small businessman entering a
field of strong competition, may institute tying agreements in order
to establish a foothold in the area.'' In each of these situations,
tie-ins used for non-monopolistic purposes may still be subject to
the per se rule. However, the courts have occasionally recognized
the incongruity of a rule which forces a business to cut its own
throat02 and have refrained from extending the per se rule to
situations where its application would be incompatible with an
equitable result.'
9 7See International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392 (1947). The issuance
of detailed specifications was felt to be infeasible by the Court in Standard Oil Co. v.
United States, supra note 96, at 306. But cf. Engbrecht v. Dairy Queen Co., 203 F.
Supp. 714 (D. Kan. 1962)
98 See, for example, the court's statement in United States v. Jerrold Electronics
Corp., 187 F. Supp. 545 (E.D. Pa. 1960), aff'd per curtam, 365 U.S. 567 (1961)
A wave of system failures at the start would have greatly retarded, if not
destroyed, this new industry and would have been disastrous for Jerrold,
Id. at 557
99 See, e.g., Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594 (1953).
100 See, e.g., Crawford Transp. Co. v. Chrysler Corp., 338 F.2d 934 (6th Cir. 1964),
cert. denied, 380 U.S. 959 (1965). For an example of a situation in winch competitors
of a supplier are accomplishing the same end without the use of a tie-in, see the. discus-
sion of the Crawford decision in the text accompanying notes 135-37 infra.
101 See Harley-Davidson Motor Co., 50 F.T.C. 1047, 1066 (1954). Note that the
small businessman may have sufficient economic power in another field to be subject
to the terms of the per se rule. For a further discussion of the merits of these defenses,
see generally Stedman, Tying Arrangements, 22 A.B.A. ANTrrRusr SECrioN 64
(1964) Professor Stedman draws an interesting, if not hopeful, analogy in discussing
the effect of business justification defenses on the application of the per se doctrine to
tie-ins:
Perhaps the situation is not unlike that wich occurs under our speed laws.
The speed law may read 30 miles per hour, with no exceptions, but if-one is
stopped for driving at a 35-mile rate at two o clock in the morning taking his
wife to the hospital, he is quite likely to beat the rap. Id. at 66.
102 Dehydrating Process Co. v. A. 0. Smith Corp., 292 F.2d 653 (1st Cir.), cert.
denied, 368 U.S. 931 (1961).
10 See, e.g., Crawford Transp. Co. v. Chrysler Corp., 338 F.2d 934 (6th Cir. 1964),
cert. denied, 380 U.S. 954 (1965); United States v. Jerrold Electronics Corp., 187 F.
Supp. 545 (E.D. Pa. 1960), affd Per curiam, 365 U.S. 567 (1961). For a history of
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The Supreme Court has demonstrated a marked propensity for
inconsistency in its treatment of business justification for tie-ins.
In International Salt Co. v. United States 4 the Court intmated
that a tie-in of salt tablets to the supplier's salt dispensing machines
would not have been declared illegal if the supplier could have
shown that only his salt tablets were capable of inducing peak effi-
ciency from the machine.0 5 This implication was ignored, however,
in the Northern Pac. decision when the Court ruled that restraints
having a pernicious effect on competition could be declared illegal
without elaborate inquiry into "the business excuse for their use.""'
By affirming the decision of the district court in United States
v. Jerrold Electronics Corp.' and thereby recognizing that under
certain circumstances tie-ins are essential to maintaining a sound
business, the Court seems to have retreated somewhat from the
overly harsh view expressed in Northern Pac. The defendant in
Jerrold negotiated tying agreements with buyers of its unique tele-
vision booster device. The purchasers were required to have the
system installed and serviced by Jerrold... and, in addition, were
obliged to buy a full community television antenna system in order
to obtain the boosting device. The district court found that both
of the requirements necessary for a per se violation had been proven
but ruled that because of "unique circumstances" the tie-in involv-
ing the service requirement was reasonable."°9 Considering the stern
language used by the Supreme Court in Northern Pan; the Jerrold
court displayed great boldness in stating that "any judicially, as op-
judicial treatment of business justification see Kintner, Some Everyday A#titrust Prob-
lems in Merchandising, 19 Bus. LAW. 955 (1964).
104 332 U.S. 392 (1947). See also International Business Mach. Corp. v. United
States, 298 U.S. 131 (1936).
105 International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392, 398 (1947).
108 Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958).
107 365 U.S. 567 (1961), affirming 187 F. Supp. 545 (E.D. Pa. 1960).
108 Such a tie-in involving services could be prohibited only under § 1 of the Sher-
man Act since § 3 of the Clayton Act is applicable only when the tied iten is a "com-
modity."
109 United States v. Jerrold Electronics Corp., 187 F. Supp. 545 (E.D. Pa. 1960),
aff'd Per curtam, 365 U.S. 567 (1961). Among the "unique" circumstances which
the court listed were:
(a) The equipment involved in the tie-in was sensitive, unstable and in need of con-
tinual adjustments.
(b) Most of the prospective buyers lacked the technical know-how to properly in-
stall or service the electronic device.
(c) Most of the purchasers were poorly financed and might refuse to pay the de-
fendant if the system did not function perfectly.
(d) The success of the defendant's business depended heavily on acceptance of this
particular product. Id. at 556.
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posed to legislatively, declared per se rule is not conclusively binding
on this court as to any set of facts not basically the same as those in
the cases in which the rule was applied.""
The opinion further noted that a blind application of the per se
doctrine to a tie-in which has sufficient "redeeming virtue" would re-
sult in a gross injustice."' Finally, the court held that the tie-in
involving the complete antenna system had been reasonable since
Jerrold could not have been expected to satisfactorily service a com-
petitor's intricate equipment.112
The significance of the Supreme Court's affirmation of the
Jerrold decision cannot be overestimated," 3 especially when viewed
together with statements made in two subsequent cases, Brown Shoe
Co. v. United States"4 and White Motor Co. v. United States.115
In Brown Shoe, the Court implied that a tying agreement used by a
small company to break into a market would not constitute a viola-
tion of the antitrust laws." 6  Similarly, the Court in White Motor
noted that tying agreements did not necessarily fall within the cate-
gory of trade practices which were illegal per se.117 Such state-
ments have opened the door through which evidence of business
justification can be admitted in the lower courts.
The Court's most recent statements in this area are not as en-
couraging as Brown Shoe and White Motor seemed to forecast.
While Atlantic Ref. Co. v. FTC"' did not involve an actual tie-in,
the "central competitive characteristic" of the arrangement in-
volved therein was held to be the same as that inherent in a tying
agreement - "the utilization of economic power in one market to
curtail competition in another.""'  Atlantic had contracted with the
Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. to sponsor the sale of Goodyear pro-
ducts to Atlantic's wholesale and retail outlets. While Goodyear
110 Ibd.
1M1 Ibid.
112 Id. at 560. It should be noted that while it refused to punish Jerrold for the
previous use of the tie-ins, the court did enjoin the company from any future use of
such agreements. The latter ruling was based on the theory that the unique and ex-
tenuating circumstances had disappeared as the product became better known and freely
accepted.
113 See, e.g., Kintner, supra note 103, at 995.
114 370 U.S. 294 (1962)
115372 U.S. 253 (1963)
116 Brown Shoe Co. v. Unmted States, 370 U.S. 294, 330 (1962) (dictum)
117 White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253, 261 (1963).
118381 U.S. 357 (1965).
-11Id. at 369.
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carried the primary sales responsibility, Atlantic was responsible
for promoting the sale of Goodyear's products to the dealers -
Atlantic receiving a commission on all such sales. 2 ' The Federal
Trade Commission found the sales-commission plan inherently
illegal as "a classic example of the use of economic power in one
market to destroy competition in another ,"i" and the
court of appeals agreed."i The Supreme Court affirmed the lower
court's decision that the plan represented an unfair method of com-
petition prohibited by the Federal Trade Commission Act."23 The
Court emphasized this by saying:
Nor can we say that the Commission erred in refusing to consider
evidence of economic justification for the program Upon con-
sidering the destructive effect on commerce that would result from
the widespread use of these contracts by major oil companies and
suppliers, we conclude that the Commission was dearly justified
in refusing the participants an opportunity to offset these evils by
a showing of economic benefit to themselves The anti-com-
petitive effects of this program are dear on the record and render
unnecessary extensive economic analysis of market percentages or
business justifications in determining whether this was a method
of competition which Congress has declared unfair and therefore
unlawfuL' 24
Whether the lower courts will interpret this language as an in-
dication that future tie-ins are to be found illegal per se remains
to be seen. But two factors would seem to operate against this
possibility. First, the Court in Atlantic carefully refrained from
labelling the arrangement illegal per se. The omission of such
language would not have been necessary if the Court intended to
imply that tie-ins in the future should be subjected to the rigors of
the per se doctrine. Second, the facts of the Atlantic case are hardly
ideal for arguing the merits of tie-ins. The only justification for
Atlantic's procedure was economic advantage; no new industry was
involved, no specifications were required, no small businessmen
were attempting to enter a market. In short, none of the circum-
stances favorable to a judicial retreat from the per se doctrine were
present. Such a case should not be made the basis for future tie-
in decisions involving different fact situations. There is some basis
120 Id. at 360-61.
121 Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 58 F.T.C. 309, 367 (1961).
122 Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. FTC, 331 F.2d 394 (7th Cir. 1964). An op-
posite decision on substantially the same facts was rendered in Texaco, Inc. v. FTC, 336
F.2d 754 (D.C. Cir. 1964).
12 3 Atlantic Ref. Co. v. FTC, 381 U.S. 357 (1965).
1241d. at 371.
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for the hope that the lower courts will not rely on Atlantic to com-
pletely outlaw tying agreements since prior to that case the district
courts and courts of appeal had significantly expanded the scope
of the "business justification" theory outlined in the Jerrold decis-
ion." A particularly interesting approach was adopted by the
court in Dehydrating Process Co. v. A. 0. Smith Corp.2 ' in order
to allow the defendant to justify its use of a tying agreement. The
decision utilized the requirement of separate products"" to escape the
application of the per se rule when the result of such application
would have been unfair. As the First Circuit Court stated,
Artides, though physically distinct may be related through csr-
cumstances. The sound business interests of the seller or, phrasing
it another way, a substantial hardship apart from the loss of the
tie-in sale may be such a circumstance We must first consider
what may be fairly treated by a seller as inseparable. 28
It has been pointed out that the Dehydrating decision recognized
business justification despite the fact that the defendant was not a
new business like Jerrold but rather was a going concern trying to
maintain its good reputation."2 9
In addition to the Dehydrating decision, the First Circuit in the
subsequent case of Baker v. Simmons Co. 8' recognized the persua-
siveness of business justification as an excuse for a tying agreement.
Simmons had been accused of unlawfully requiring motels which
desired to display its trademark to also purchase its mattresses. While
admitting that Simmons' tie-in of the use of its mattresses by motels
125What could have been the greatest extension of the concept was implied in Al-
bert H. Cayne Equip. Corp. v. Union Asbestos & Rubber Co., 220 F. Supp. 784 (S.D.
N.Y. 1963) when the court stated:
Thus it seems that, despite earlier statements that tying arrangements are
illegal per se, they are 'not necessarily so.' We conclude therefore that tying
arrangements are not per se violations of Section 1 of the Sherman Act. Id.
at 788. (Emphasis added.)
The force of this statement was diluted, however, by the court's subsequent holding that
tying agreements were illegal under the Sherman Act when the supplier had sufficient
economic power and the agreement affected a not insubstantial amount of commerce.
This, of course, is almost a verbatim restatement of the per se rule.
126 292 F.2d 653 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 931 (1961). In Dehydrating,
the defendant had refused to sell a grain unloader unless it was to be used in conjunction
with a silo manufactured by defendant. Defendant justified the tie-in on the basis that
prior to its establishment, 50% of the customers purchasing the unloader had com-
plained that it would not work correctly when used on a competitor s silo.
127See text accompanying notes 28-39 supra.
'
28 Dehydranng Process Co. v. A. 0. Smith Corp., 292 F.2d 653, 655 (1st Cir.),
cert. denied, 368 U.S. 931 (1961). (Emphasis added.)
'
29 Kinmer, supra note 103, at 996.
180 307 F.2d 458 (1st Cir. 1962).
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to advertising containing its trademark might be contrary to a literal
interpretation of section 3 of the Clayton Act, the court held that
the company had a legitimate interest in seeing that the public
was not confused by the use of the Simmons' trademark. 1 and thus
was justified in the employment of a tie-m to protect against such
confusion.
In Susser v. Carvel Corp.3' the Second Circuit refused to invali-
date a tying agreement by which a supplier of ingredients for ice
cream which eventually was to be sold under Ins trademark required
the purchase of a machine as a condition to the sale of the ingre-
dients. The supplier contended that the particular machine was
essential to the production of ice cream which would conform to
the high quality which the public associated with the supplier's
mark. In upholding the legality of the arrangement, the court
noted that protection of the supplier's goodwill required such an
agreement since alternative measures, such as the use of specifica-
tions, would be impractical in this situation."'
The, Sixth Circuit appears to be divided on the question of
whether business considerations should be examined in determining
the legality of a tie-in.'TM  In Crawford Transp. Co. v. Chrysler
Corp."5 the plaintiff charged that Chrysler was practicing an un-
lawfil tie-in by requiring its auto distributors to accept the manu-
facturer's choice of carrier service, for which the dealer eventually
paid, as a contingency to the grant of a franchise to distribute
Chrysler's automobiles. The court declined to find the tying agree-
ment illegal since Chrysler not only did not directly profit from the
tie-m arrangement,' but also was forced to adopt this procedure
because of business conditions. The latter finding was based on
the fact that for years Chrysler's two main competitors had been em-
ploying a substantially smaller number of carriers at a considerable
savings to themselves. Chrysler's previous practice of allowing its
131 Id. at 469.
132 332 F.2d 505 (2d Cir. 1964), petition for cert. dismtssed, 381 U.S. 125 (1965).
138Id. at 519. But see Switzer Bros. v. Locklin, 297 F.2d 39 (7th Cir. 1961),
cert. dented, 369 U.S. 851 (1962). See generally, Note, Quality Control and the Ants-
trust Laws st Trademark Licensmg, 72 YALE LJ. 1171 (1963).
'a Compare Crawford Transp. Co. v. Chrysler Corp., 338 F.2d 934 (6th Cir.
1964), cert. dented, 381 U.S. 954 (1965), with Associated Press v. Taft-Ingalls Corp.,
340 F.2d 753 (6th Cir. 1965).
285 Crawford Transp. Co. v. Chrysler Corp., supra note 134.
136Id. at 939. The defendant (Chrysler) used the tie-ins to substantially decrease
the number of carners which previously transported its cars to dealers. The result was
a considerable savings to Chrysler. But the court found this to be an indirect profit
from the agreement and thus not illegal.
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dealers to choose their carriers had resulted in expensive, time-
consuming delays because of the large number of carriers shipping
Chrysler cars. Since Chrysler was now attempting to reduce the
number of its carriers in order to better compete with Ford and
General Motors, its use of a tie-in as a means to that end was held
to be justified.'
Unlike the decision in Crawford, the Sixth Circuit failed to
consider business justification in Associated Press v Taft-Ingalls
Corp.' The case involved a tying agreement by which the Associ-
ated Press attempted to force newspapers desiring to utilize one of
its wire services to also accept other less beneficial services. After
methodically examining the tie-in for the existence of separate pro-
ducts, sufficient economic power, and influence on a not msub-
stantial amount of commerce, the court summarily branded the
arrangement illegal without considering any mitigating circum-
stances which might have existed." 9
In the Ninth Circuit case of Jerrold Electronics Corp. v. Wes-
coast Broadcasting Co.,'4" the court conducted a lengthy mvestiga-
tion into the possible existence of circumstances which might justify
the alleged tie-in, but failed to discover any justification and ruled
that the agreement was unlawful. 4' The conflict between the per
se rule and the rule of reason is dearly distinguishable by the state-
ment in the opinion that while cases such as Northern Pac. and
International Salt might have authorized the finding that the tie-in
was illegal per se the court nevertheless declined to find the agree-
ment unlawful before investigating as to whether "there was a bona
fide and reasonable business necessity for selling his (the supplier's)
product only with another product or service.' 142
'37 Crawford Transp. Co. v. Chrysler Corp., 338 F.2d 934, 939 (6th Cir. 1964),
cert. dented, 380 U.S. 954 (1965). Whether the fact that competitors are practicing
the same restraint, or achieving the desired end by means unavailable to the supplier
is a mitigating factor in determining the legality of a tie-in, is quesuonable. Cf. Times-
Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594, 623-24 (1953); Standard Oil
Co. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293, 299 (1949)
138340 F.2d 753 (6th Cit. 1965) The three judges sitting in the Taft case differed
from those who gave the Crawford decision.
139 Id. at 769.
140 341 F.2d 653 (9th Cit. 1965)
141 Id. at 663. The defendant has the burden of showing sufficient business just-
fication. United States v. Jerrold Electronics Corp., 187 F. Supp. 545 (E.D. Pa. 1960),
aff'd per curam, 365 U.S. 567 (1961).
142 Jerrold Electronics Corp. v. Wescoast Broadcasting Co., 341 F.2d 653 (9th Cit.
1965). (Emphasis added.)
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V. CONCLUSION
Decisions such as those in Crawford, Dehydrating Process, and
the two Jerrold cases indicate the beginning of a more tolerant
judicial attitude toward tying agreements. But this trend is subject
to change by future pronouncements of the Supreme Court. The
major significance of future decisions will lie not in their ultimate
holdings, but rather in their disposition toward business considera-
tions which might be relied upon by the prospective defendants as a
justification for the use of a tie-in. Should the Court completely ig-
nore such evidence as it did in the Atlantic decasion,143 the applica-
bility of the per se rule to tie-ins will be firmly re-established.
On the other hand, any further indication by the Court that it
is retreating from the strict language of Northern Pac. may initially
have unfortunate consequences. For example, a further decrease
in opposition to tie-ins might invite rash attempts by business to
capitalize on the developing trend. Few of these efforts will be
prompted by reasons other than a desire to monopolize. In order
to meet such a possibility, the courts must thoroughly investigate
these future practices for evidence of monopolistic intent. It is
submitted that such investigations could overcome the initial draw-
backs of expressly recognizing business justification for tie-ins and
therefore that such recognition should be given by the Court.
While the per se rule presents a more inviting alternative because
of its easily applied criteria, such a strict doctrine appears to be out-
of-place in an area of commerce where complexity is the rule rather
than the exception. The burdens which the courts must shoulder
under a less restrictive view are necessary to an equitable administra-
tion of the antitrust laws. The Supreme Court may have already
recognized this with its decision in Jerrold, and its statements in
Brown Shoe and White Motor If further relaxation of the applica-
tion of the per se doctrine is forthcoming, its arrival will be a wel-
come and entirely justified addition to the interpretation of the
antitrust laws.
DALE C. LAPORTE
143 Atlantc Ref. Co. v. FTC, 381 U.S. 357 (1965).
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